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AN ANONYMOUS TREATISE ON LAW: THE
PSEUDO-PLATONIC DIALOGUE MINOS
Among the many smaller writings which at one time or
another have been attributed to Plato, we possess a short
dialogue entitled Minas.' Although this work is not entirely
unworthy of Plato, there exists today little doubt among
competent classical scholars that it is an excellent imitation
of Plato's early style and technique by one of his last disciples whose name is unknown to us.2 From all appearances
we may safely assume that the Minos was composed shortly
after the completion of Plato's Laws (Nomoi). 3 The anonymous author of the Minos makes full use of the History
of Euphorus " who maintains the thesis that the laws promulgated by the famous Spartan law-giver Lycurgus5 were
derived from Crete, or to be more exact, from the fabulous
King Minos. Plato, on the other hand, in his genuine
1

The Neo-Platonist Thrasyllus, who wrote during the reign of Emperor

Tiberius (14-37 A. D.), included the Minos among the genuine works of Plato.
See his Tetralogies IX; Compare also Diogenes Laertius Ill, 57.
2 The first to point out in a truly scholarly manner the fact that the Minos
could not possibly be a genuine dialogue of Plato is Boeckh, A., in his In Pitstonis qui vulgo jertur Minoem, Halle a/S., 1807. Boeckh's arguments are so
weighty that they preclude any possibility of attributing the Mines to Plato
himself. On the other hand, we are unable to assign the Minos to any particular
author, although we are justified in assuming that the anonymous author is one
of the disciples of Plato who was thoroughly familiar with Plato's early style
and who displays an astonishing grasp of Platonic thought.
3 The Laws can be dated with reasonable accuracy. Plato died 348/347.
The Laws were published posthumously, that is, after 348/347. Now Isocrates
in his Philip, published in 346, refers both to Plato's Republic and Laws.
Hence the Laws must have been published in 347/346.
4 See Jacoby, F. Die Fragmente der Griechischen Historiker II A, p. 94,
frag. 174 and frag. 149.
5 It is now commonly held that Lycurgus or Lyco-vorgas ("Wolf-repelher")
was not a historical figure, but rather an Arcadian deity or "hero" who was
worshipped by the Arcadian shepherds as the protector of their flocks. Herodotus
(1,65) himself seems to debate whether Lycurgus was a god or a man when he
quotes a Delphic oracle:

"Welcome, Lycurgus, come to my rich shrine,
Whom Zeus loves well, and all celestials love;
Shall I declare thee human or divine?"
6 There is a difficulty about King Minos of Crete. In Homer he appears
as an Achean ruler in Crete-and not as a Cretan-two generations before the
Trojan War; that is, about the middle of the thirteenth century B. C. It was
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dialogue Laws does not accept this theory 7 which had already been mentioned by Herodotus.8
Irrespective of the fact that the Minos is definitely not
the work of Plato, it is nevertheless one of the most important philosophical treatises on law in that it definitely marks
the beginning of what we would call legal philosophy in the
narrower sense of the term. In order to understand the
scope of the Minos we will have to keep in mind that this
dialogue resumes the discussion about the nature of law
which had been taken up in the first book of the Laws'
held by some Greek writers in later times that there were actually two Cretan
kings of that name, of whom the earlier reigned towards the end of the fifteenth
century B. C. This view finds some support in Homer himself. See Iliad XIV,
321, as against Odyssey XI,322, and Odyssey XIX,179. Hence it is quite possible
that Minos I., the "Destroyer," was the leader of some Achaean invaders who conquered Crete, destroyed the cities of Phaestus and Hagia Triada in 1406 (?), and
made Cnossus their capital. This Minos would also be the founder of the
Creto-Achaean thalassocracy (rule of the sea), famous in later Greek tradition.
Minos II., on the other hand, might have been the leader of a band of Achaean
and Carian raiders who invaded the Nile delta and were repelled by Pharao Merenptah in 1229 B. C. This Minos II. is probably the king to whom Homer is referring. Herodotus, however, erroneously made Minos I. and Minos II. into one
king (1,171; 1,173; 111,122). Homer (Odyssey XIX,160) also mentions the fact
that in Crete "there dwelled Cydonians, Dorians of three tribes, and proud
Pelasgians," insinuating thereby that Crete had been conquered by peoples from
the Greek mainland. As to the name "Pelasgians," see Plutarch, Pyrrhus 1: "Of the
Thesprotians and Molossians after the great flood, the first king . . . was Phaeton
. . . who came into Epirus with Pelasgus." The Pelasgians are, therefore, the
descendants of Pelasgus. The various attempts to explain the word Pelasgians-those are the original dwellers in Greece-by linking it to the Greek word
pelargos (the stork), are plain nonsense.
7 Laws 624 ". . . among us Cretans he (scil., the author of the law) is said
they say that Apollo is their lawto have been Zeus, but in Lacedaemon ...
giver . . ."
8 Herodotus 1,65. It seems, however, that the stronger argument of Ephorus
in favor of the Cretan origin of Lycurgus' laws was necessary to convince the
Greeks, in particular the author of the Minos as well as Aristotle who fully accepted the story that the Spartan laws originally came from Crete. See Aristotle,
Politics 1271 b 20 ff.; particularly 1271 b 24: "According to tradition, Lycurgus
... went abroad and spent most of his time in Crete."
9 Plato, Laws 644D: "... there is reflection about the good and evil of them
(scil., the laws) . . . And this, when embodied in a decree by the state, is called
law . . . May we not conceive each of us living beings to be a puppet of the
gods . .. created with a purpose ... ? We know that .. . affections within us are
like cords and strings, which pull us in different directions and opposite ways, and
to opposite actions: And herein lies the difference between virtue and vice . . .
There is one among these cords which every man should take hold of and never
let go . . . and this is the sacred and golden cord of reason, called by us the
common law of the state. There are other cords which are hard and of iron, but
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without, however, achieving any conclusive results. Hence
in the Minas the same question concerning the nature or
essence of the law is being reformulated once again by contrasting the positive or man-made law with "philosophy,"
that is to say, with the rational natural law. A student, who
discusses this problem with Socrates, begins first by defining
law in general as being that which is prescribed or commanded by a politically organized society."° Socrates counters by pointing out the fundamental error of this one-sided
definition. For sight, Socrates insists, is not identical with
that which is seen, but basically different from the latter.
Hence "reason" (logos) cannot be that which is actually being said (td legomena), but something essentially beyond
this. In the further development of this argument Socrates
introduces the concept of the teckn6, the art of right thinking which in Plato's system plays an all-important role.
Teckn6, we are told, consists in the discovery of the real
thing, the pragma, or, as we would put'it, true being. 1 The
student, however, is still under the impression that Socrates
is referring to the actual "positive" laws and enacted ordinances of a given politically organized society and hence
volunteers a second definition of law which sees in the latter
a dogma poleos," that is to say, the concrete instrumentality
or rule of a given State.
this one is soft because it is golden ... Now we ought always to cooperate with
the lead of the best, which is law. For inasmuch as reason is beautiful and gentle,
and not violent, her rule of necessity must have ministers in order to help the
golden principle in conquering the other principles. And thus the moral of the
tale about our being puppets will not have been lost, and the meaning of the
expression 'superior or inferior to a man's self' will become clearer. And the
individual, attaining to right reason in this matter of pulling, the strings of the
puppet should live according to its rule; while the state, receiving the same from
some god or from one who has knowledge of these things, should embody it in a
law, to be its guide in its dealings with itself and with other states. In this
fashion virtue and vice will be more clearly distinguished by us. And when they
have become clearer, education and other institutions will in like manner become clearer . . ."
10 Minos 313B.
11 Minos 314B.
12

Minos 314BC.
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This second definition of the student makes it quite clear
that the latter conceives of law only in terms of man-made
laws, and that he believes law to be but the sum total of enforced human enactments. Socrates, on the other hand, attempts to point out that in order to grasp the full significance
of the term "law" one has to go beyond the fact that it also
happens to be something which is valid because it is or might
be enforced by the State. 8 Thus he proposes that the true
meaning of the law should be understood in terms and in relation to objective value, that is to say, in terms of objective
good or objective evil. 4 A "true" law, according to Socrates,
of necessity must always have something truly and objectively good for its object and end. And this objective good
is real and exists in the State. True law, therefore, is actually nothing else than the discovery of something truly good
and really existing; in other words, it must be related to being qua being. Positive law, on the other hand, may be either
good or bad, useful or harmful for society. Hence it cannot be "true" law in the strict sense of the term, lacking this
necessary ordination to the absolute and objective good.'"
The main argument of Socrates, therefore, is that "true"
law is always related to the nature of reality, and that justice signifies harmony with true being.' 6 Hence the authority of law depends on its relation to being, a statement which
on the main but reiterates a basic Greek assumption that the
law is the clue to the very nature of things, in other words,
13 This is an old problem which had already been discussed rather thoroughly by the Sophists. The real question with which they were faced was whether
above and beyond individual opinion there is anything whatever that could be
called absolute right and just.
14 Minos 314Dff.
15

Minos 315A.

16 Among the early Greek thinkers we are able to discern two basic presuppositions which are being considered self-evident. The first is concerned with
the validity of the law, the second with the assertion that obedience to the law is
of advantage. The naive mind obeys the laws without asking whence they come
or by what they are justified. The laws actually exist; they are here once for
all, and the individual has to abide by them. None of the Pre-Sophistic thinkers
thought of examining these laws or of asking in what their claim to validity consists.
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declaratory of true being. The truth which law reveals is
the knowledge and understanding of being." In the Minos
we are once more confronted with the same problem. For
if we are told here that true law consists in discovering true
and real being (exeuresis ontos), then this assertion simply
implies that all true law must be just law. For justice in its
ultimate significance is synonymous with true reality and
objective being. This idea of justice is at the basis of all
classical Greek legal thought and legal philosophy.
Admittedly, man-made laws change in time and are different in different places,' 8 a fact which is not being denied by
Socrates." But, interposes Socrates, the "good" as such is
always the same and, therefore, really "is." And the good,
being real, is always the same and, hence, unchangeable. The
man-made law should have for its sole object the "good,"
that is to say, that which always is, and not that which is
not, namely evil. By failing to make the real and true good
its object any man-made law misses that which is truly
"legal" in the higher sense of true law.2" "Legal," there17 This idea, which might be called a classical expression of early Greek
thought, was first expressed by Parmenides. See Diels, H. Die Fragmente der
Vorsokratiker, frag. 1,28.
18 Minos 315Bff.
19 During the period of Sophistic speculation law became a subject of devious
philosophical discussion. The citizens of republican states became accustomed to
reflect and decide upon the grounds and validity of the laws, and by doing so
they actually put themselves and their personal opinions and views above the
law, at least in their judgments. Besides noting these frequent changes of laws
or legal enactments, attention also became focused on the great variety
of laws exhibited not only in the various legal systems of the different states and
nations, but also in the usages found among different peoples. In consequence it
was held that the principle of universal validity for all men, times, and places
could no longer be attributed to the laws, at least the man-made laws.
In the face of all these problems the serious question arose whether there is
anything whatever that could be called valid everywhere and always, a law, that
is to say, which is completely independent of the differences between peoples, states,
and times and thus authoritative for all. The real issue, therefore, was whether
there is such a thing as a law determined by the unchanging nature and order of
things (Physis) ; whether there is a law exalted above all mutations and all differences, contrasted by the ever changing features of human legal institutions and
the man-made laws. This contrast between nature and fnstitution, natural law
and positive law is undoubtedly the most characteristic achievement of the Sophistic period.
20 Minos 316B.
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fore, is that which is right and just in the sense of being
related to the innermost nature of being, to the eternal order
of things which stands for eternal justice. True law being
always based upon that which truly is, is therefore valid for
all of mankind.2 ' True law, like true being, is never subject
to change. For the objective good is immutable.
Pressed for an answer as to how we are able to arrive at
such a true law, Socrates can only give an allegorical answer
which, however, is of deep significance: 22 All true law comes
from God or, as Heracleitus of Ephesus had put it, "all human laws derive their substance from that one law which is
of God." 23 Hence Socrates introduces the mystical personality of King Minos of Crete,24 the oldest and most venerable
law-giver of ancient Greece. This Minos is said to have derived his wisdom directly from Zeus with whom, according
to the testimony of Homer,2" he has had intellectual conversation for nine years.26 During these nine years Zeus conferred upon him divine wisdom, in other words, that type of
wisdom which is necessary in order to understand the true
nature of being and the true essence of true law.
Hence
Minos 316D.
Minos 319Bff.
23 Diels, op. dt., Heracleitus frag. 114.
24 See note 6, supra; Obviously, King Minos to whom Socrates is referring
here, is only in name identical with the two historical Creto-Achaean kings mentioned in note 6.
25 Homer, Iliad XIX, 178: "...
where the monarch Minos dwelled, he who
had at every nine years' end conversed with Zeus almighty . . ."
26 This anonymous author of the Minos correctly translates this Homeric
passage as meaning "intellectual intercourse with Zeus" and not, as most people
interpreted it, as signifying carousing and merry-making.
27 Minos 319 Cf. The idea that the human law-giver has received the law
from the gods is a very ancient notion. The Louvre, for instance, possesses a
sculptural relief of the Babylonian king Hammurabi receiving his famous code
of law from the sun god Marduk (about 2000 B. C.). Another famous example
is found in Plato's dialogue Gorgias 322C ff.: ". . . the desire of self-preservation
gathered men into cities. But when they were .gathered together, having no art
of government, they evil intreated one another, and were again in the process of
dissolution and destruction. Zeus feared that the entire human race would be exterminated, and so he sent Hermes to them, bringing to them a sense of restraint
(aidos) and a feeling for what is right and just (dike) to be the contolling principles of states . . . Hermes asked Zeus how he should impart this eidos and dike
21

22
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when the anonymous author of the Minos quotes the famous
line from Hesiod where King Minos is said to have "the scepter of Zeus," he merely tries, by the use of allegory, to convey
the notion that King Minos had been endowed with divine
wisdom.2" Under the skillful interpretation of Socrates the
scepter of Zeus, this age-old symbol of justice, is transformed
into the knowledge and undertanding of that which truly is
in an objective sense. And law, true law, is nothing else
than the eternal truth of that which really is."

All knowl-

edge and understanding of objective reality, however, also
pre-supposes a knowledge and understanding of that which
is objectively good. But such knowledge is not mere experience or personal opinion; it is teckig the art of right thinking and correct reasoning which starts from true being and
has as its final object true being. Such knowledge also comprises the practical realization of the good, a realization, that
is, which must be the practice of true justice and the things
that are right. In order to practice true justice in the administration of the State, the law-giver stands in need of a
higher, a philosophical education.30 And this philosophical
education, again, has to be based on a knowledge which in its
ultimate foundations is divine. 1
Anton-Hermann Chroust

... to a favored few only . . . or . . .to all men?
To all, Zeus replied, for I
should like them all to have a share. For states cannot exist, if a few only share
in the virtues.. .."
28 Minos 320D. Hesiod, who in this differs from Homer, conceives Zeus as
being the embodiment of justice. All justice is, therefore, directly from Zeus. In
this fashion justice receives a definite and commanding position in the divine
order of things. Zeus gave justice (ike), that is, a sense of what is right
and just, because it "is the supreme good of life." Hesiod, Works and Days 276 if.
29 Minos 321B.
80 Minos 321C. This passage reminds us of the famous exhortation of Plato:
"Until philosophers are kings, or the kings and princes of this earth have the
spirit and power of philosophy, and political greatness and philosophical wisdom
meet in one . . . cities will never have rest from their evils-no, nor the human
race . . ." Republic 473C. Compare also ibid. 487E: ". . . cities will not cease
from evil until philosophers rule in them . ." ibid. 01E ff.; 540A ff.; 53; 592.
81 Minos 322A.

